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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




Karen Kralik appeals from the district court's December 
16, 1996 order entering summary judgment against her 
under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. S 701 et seq., and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 
S 12101 et seq., and from the district court's January 14, 
1997 order denying her motion for reconsideration. The 
appellee, John Durbin, cross appeals from the portion of 
the December 16, 1996 order denying summary judgment 
as to one issue even though the order dismissed Kralik's 
complaint. We will affirm the orders granting summary 
judgment and denying the motion for reconsideration and 
will dismiss the cross appeal. 
 
Kralik alleged in her complaint that she is an individual 
with a disability employed as a toll collector by the 
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, an instrumentality of 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, at its Allegheny Valley 
Interchange. Durbin is Executive Director of the 
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Commission so as a matter of convenience and reality we 
will refer to him as the "Commission." Kralik asserted that 
she suffered a back injury in an automobile accident 
unrelated to her work. She further asserted that she sought 
from the Commission the reasonable accommodation of 
being relieved from forced overtime "as she cannot work for 
more than eight hours at a time" because of her injuries. 
The Commission, however, refused to grant the 
accommodation except on a temporary basis. After the 
Commission filed an answer, it moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds that Kralik is not a qualified 
individual with a disability and that, in any event, the 
Commission is not obligated to make the requested  
accommodation.1 
 
In its opinion dated December 13, 1996, the district court 
noted that Kralik had worked for the Commission since 
1988 as a toll collector and in 1990 had become a 
permanent Commission employee at the Allegheny Valley 
Interchange. Kralik was in a bargaining unit represented by 
Teamsters Local Union No. 250. At all relevant times the 
union was a party to a collective bargaining agreement with 
the Commission which included the following overtime 
provision: 
 
        Section 11. In a twenty-four (24) hour operation, if 
       the Commission experiences difficulty in obtaining a 
       replacement for any work shift, they will call employees 
       using the seniority system described herein. If no 
       employee accepts the assignment, it shall be offered by 
       seniority to employees at the work site. In the event 
       they refuse, the least senior employee, including any 
       temporary employees in the needed job classifications, 
       shall remain as the replacement. A temporary employee 
       shall not be permitted to work overtime when a full- 
       time employee is ready, willing and able to perform the 
       overtime work in question. Temporary Toll Collectors 
       who are scheduled to work forty (40) hours or who 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. It also urged that Kralik failed to exhaust the remedies provided in 
the 
collective bargaining agreement between her union, Teamsters Local 
Union No. 250, and the Commission, but that issue is no longer in the 
case so we make no further reference to it. 
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       have already worked forty (40) hours in a given work 
       week are not to be asked to work a vacant shift unless 
       all the Temporary Toll Collectors who are not 
       scheduled to work nor have worked forty (40) hours 
       and all the permanent Toll Collectors have refused to 
       work the vacant shift. All hours worked by a 
       Temporary Toll Collector will be counted towards the 
       forty (40) hours requirement except those hours 
       worked which were first offered to and refused by all 
       eligible permanent Toll Collectors. 
 
        Scheduled work time must be adjusted to comply 
       with the above. 
 
        A. Consistent with Article IX, in the event that 
       overtime opportunities are refused by all employees, 
       the overtime shift shall be assigned to the employee 
       currently working with the least amount of seniority. 
       This will be known as a `forced overtime assignment'. 
 
The court observed that after two medical leaves of 
absence due to her back injury, Kralik on November 7, 
1994, submitted a "Reasonable Accommodation Form" to 
the Commission requesting exemption from forced overtime 
requirements. Kralik subsequently filed a charge with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") 
asserting that the Turnpike Commission had violated the 
ADA in not making an accommodation and that the union, 
Kralik, and the Commission later had entered into an 
agreement temporarily excusing her from being forced to 
work overtime. Then, as the court noted, she filed this 
action seeking relief under both the ADA and section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. S 794. 
 
The court, citing Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 64 (1995), held that the 
similarities between the two statutes permit a joint analysis 
of Kralik's claims.2 The court then explained: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. As noted in Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1514-15 (2d Cir. 
1995), "[t]he Rehabilitation Act . . . prohibits disability-based 
discrimination by government agencies and other recipients of federal 
funds . . . ." The ADA has a broader scope as it defines a "covered 
entity" 
as "an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor- 
management committee." 42 U.S.C. S 12111(2). Certain employers, 
however, are not included within section 12111(2). See 42 U.S.C. 
S 12111(5). 
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        [U]nder either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, a 
       plaintiff can state a claim for discrimination based 
       upon her employer's failure to accommodate her 
       handicap by alleging facts showing (1) that the 
       employer is subject to the statute under which the 
       claim is brought, (2) that she is an individual with a 
       disability within the meaning of the statute in question, 
       (3) that, with or without reasonable accommodation, 
       she could perform the essential functions of the job, 
       and (4) that the employer had notice of the plaintiff's 
       disability and failed to provide such accommodation. 
 
Slip op. at 6 (quoting Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 68 F.3d 
1512, 1515 (2d Cir. 1995)). For purposes of its summary 
judgment motion, the Commission agreed that it was 
subject to both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and had 
notice of Kralik's alleged disability, yet sought summary 
judgment on the grounds that Kralik was not a qualified 
individual with a disability and could not, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, perform the essential functions 
of the job as a toll collector. 
 
As the court noted, both the ADA and the Rehabilitation 
Act define "disability" as a "physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits" one or more of the major life 
activities of the individual claiming to have a disability. 42 
U.S.C. S 12102(2); 29 U.S.C. S 706(26). Major life activities 
include "functions such as caring for oneself, performing 
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, 
breathing, learning and working," 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(i), as 
well as "sitting, standing, lifting [and] reaching." 29 C.F.R. 
S 1630 app. 
 
After analyzing the record the court concluded as follows: 
(1) Kralik did not produce evidence that her ability to work, 
to engage in the major life activities of caring for herself or 
her house, to travel or engage in leisure activities, or to 
twist had been substantially impaired; but (2) there was a 
genuine dispute of fact as to whether Kralik's ability to sit, 
stand, and stoop had been impaired. Thus, the court 
denied the Commission's motion for summary judgment on 
the issue of whether Kralik was a qualified individual with 
a disability. 
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The court next considered the Commission's alternate 
contention that Kralik's claim could not succeed because 
the requested accommodation, exemption from the forced 
overtime provision, was not reasonable. In this regard the 
Commission pointed out that such an exemption could 
require the Commission to compel an employee with more 
seniority than Kralik to work overtime, forcing the 
Commission to infringe another employee's seniority rights 
under the collective bargaining agreement. 
 
The court cited various cases under the Rehabilitation 
Act and the ADA supporting a conclusion that a measure 
that violates a seniority system established in a collective 
bargaining agreement is not a "reasonable accommodation," 
and thus is not required by the ADA. See Eckles v. 
Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1052 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(discussed below), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1318 (1997); 
Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th 
Cir. 1995) ("The ADA does not require that Northwest take 
action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other 
workers under a collective bargaining agreement."); Wooten 
v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir. 1995) ("An 
employer is not required to make accommodations that 
would violate the rights of other employees. Farmland 
Foods had no obligation to terminate other employees or 
violate a collective bargaining agreement in order to 
accommodate Wooten, even if it perceived him to have a 
substantial impairment.") (citation omitted); Milton v. 
Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 1995) ("An 
employer is not required by the ADA to reallocate job duties 
in order to change the essential function of a job. An 
accommodation that would result in other employees 
having to work[ ] harder or longer hours is not required.") 
(citations omitted); Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st 
Cir. 1989) ("Consequently, we . . . conclude that the postal 
service was not required to accommodate plaintiff further 
by placing him in a different position since to do so would 
violate the rights of other employees under the collective 
bargaining agreement."); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467 
(4th Cir. 1987) ("Reassigning Carter to permanent light 
duty, when he was not entitled to one of a limited number 
of light duty positions, might have interfered with the rights 
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of other employees under the collective bargaining 
agreement."). 
 
The court found that Kralik's requested accommodation 
would infringe upon the legitimate seniority rights of other 
employees established in the collective bargaining 
agreement. The court then, for the very reason that the 
accommodation was temporary, rejected Kralik's contention 
that the temporary agreement described above amounted to 
a concession that the requested accommodation is 
reasonable. See Shea, 870 F.2d at 789 & n.4 (holding that 
employer was not required to institute permanent 
accommodation that would violate rights under collective 
bargaining agreement despite employer's ability to maintain 
accommodation temporarily without compromising other 
employees' rights). Thus, the court concluded that 
"regardless of Kralik's ability to establish that one or more 
of her major life activities were substantially limited, the 
requested accommodation is not reasonable, in that it 
would require the Commission to violate the seniority 
rights of other employees as set forth in the collective 
bargaining agreement." Consequently, the court granted the 
Commission summary judgment. 
 
Subsequently, Kralik moved for reconsideration 
contending, as she explains in her brief, that there was "an 
agreement between the Teamsters and the . . . Commission 
regarding the accommodation of another fare collector 
[which] permits assigning [the collector] to a shift 
independently of the bidding process required by the 
collective bargaining agreement." Br. at 5. The 
documentation attached to Kralik's motion included a letter 
from the union to the Commission stating that as long as 
the other collector's request is covered by and was 
reasonable under the ADA, the union would not object to 
the assignment of that collector and "will process no 
grievances concerning this matter." App. at 93. The district 
court denied the motion for reconsideration as Kralik did 
not explain why she had not produced this evidence earlier.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The court also indicated in denying the motion for reconsideration that 
Kralik "neither relied on the EEOC amicus brief in her earlier brief nor 
mentioned that the 7th Circuit rejected the argument therein." We are 
uncertain why Kralik's failure to rely on the EEOC brief was germane to 
the motion but we believe that the reference to the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit probably was to Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1050-52, which 
we cite above and discuss at great length below. 
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Kralik then appealed and the Commission cross appealed. 
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 
and 1343 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
We exercise plenary review over the order granting 
summary judgment but will review the order denying 




A. The appeal 
 
Preliminarily we point out that Kralik does not question 
the district court's joint analysis of her ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act claims. Thus, she does not contend that 
she might be entitled to relief under one act but not the 
other. Consequently, while we will focus our analysis 
primarily on the ADA, our analysis in this case applies 
equally to her Rehabilitation Act claim. The ADA provides 
that prohibited discrimination includes "not making 
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or 
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with 
a disability." 42 U.S.C. S 12112(b)(5)(A). Inasmuch as the 
district court held that there was a material dispute of fact 
as to whether she was a qualified individual with a 
disability, Kralik primarily challenges the district court's 
determination that the Commission did not discriminate 
against her in violation of the ADA by failing to exempt her 
from the forced overtime provisions of her union's collective 
bargaining agreement. 
 
In urging us to reverse she points to 42 U.S.C. 
S 12112(b)(2), an ADA provision which provides that 
discrimination includes a covered entity's: 
 
       participating in a contractual or other arrangement or 
       relationship that has the effect of subjecting a covered 
       entity's qualified applicant or employee with a disability 
       to the discrimination prohibited by this subchapter 
       (such relationship includes a relationship with an 
       employment or referral agency, labor union, an 
       organization providing fringe benefits to an employee of 
       the covered entity, or an organization providing 
       training and apprenticeship programs). 
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She then argues that under both the Rehabilitation Act, as 
amended in 1991, and the ADA, an employer should 
consider making an accommodation by reassigning an 
employee. See Br. at 9 (citing Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 
827, 832 (3d Cir. 1996)). She further contends that the 
Commission's adherence to the forced overtime provision in 
the collective bargaining agreement violates the plain 
language of 42 U.S.C. S 12112(b)(2), and thus of the 
Rehabilitation Act, and that the legislative history of the 
ADA supports her position by establishing that an " `entity 
may not do through a contractual provision what it may not 
do directly . . . .' " Br. at 10 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 485(II) 
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 59-60 (1990)). 
 
She also argues that EEOC guidelines favor a flexible 
approach wherein unions and employers "consult and work 
out an accommodation," br. at 14, and maintains that the 
Commission could accommodate her by excusing her from 
forced overtime without undue hardship, difficulty or 
expense. Br. at 16. In fact, as Kralik emphasizes, the union 
and the Commission agreed on a temporary basis that the 
Commission would not force Kralik to work overtime and, 
as she pointed out in her motion for reconsideration, the 
Commission with the union's agreement accommodated 
another toll collector by assigning him to a shift without 
regard for the bidding process in the collective bargaining 
agreement. Furthermore, in practice the Commission rarely 
would need to assign Kralik to forced overtime. Indeed, at 
oral argument before this court Kralik indicated that during 
the pendency of this litigation the Commission never has 
required her to work forced overtime. She also contends 
that the cases relied on by the district court and cited 
above are either factually distinct or incorrectly decided. Br. 
at 17-19. 
 
In considering the merits of this appeal we reiterate that 
the accommodation Kralik seeks would require the 
Commission to violate the collective bargaining agreement. 
Nevertheless, we agree with her that the collective 
bargaining agreement is not necessarily decisive because 
the union and the Commission together may modify the 
agreement as they did on a temporary basis by relieving her 
from forced overtime. But Kralik points to nothing in the 
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record to support a contention that the union has 
communicated to the Commission a willingness to waive 
the forced overtime provision with respect to her as long as 
she is a qualified individual with a disability. 4 Rather, she 
refers to a letter to her by the secretary-treasurer of her 
union stating that "it may be possible to waive[the forced 
overtime] provision if it can be shown that your injury 
qualifies you under the [ADA]." App. at 82-83. Of course, a 
union waiver of the forced overtime provision would vitiate 
the Commission's argument that it could not accommodate 
Kralik without violating the agreement. Unfortunately for 
Kralik, however, the union has not given the Commission 
such a waiver. Accordingly, the issue before us is clear: is 
the accommodation Kralik seeks unreasonable because it 
would require the Commission to infringe on the seniority 
rights of other employees in the collective bargaining 
agreement?5 
 
On this point we follow Eckles, 94 F.3d 1041, which is a 
compelling precedent. In that case Eckles, who suffered 
from epilepsy, sought from his employer, Conrail, an 
accommodation consisting of an assignment to a position 
appropriate for his disability. The difficulty with his request 
was that it would have required Conrail to infringe on the 
seniority rights of other employees under the collective 
bargaining agreement. Id. at 1043. Thus, while Conrail did 
not contend that the accommodation would place an undue 
burden on it, it argued that the accommodation simply was 
not required "due to its effects on the legitimate seniority 
rights of other employees." Id. at 1045. Accordingly, the 
issue in Eckles was: "whether the ADA requires as 
`reasonable accommodation' that a disabled individual be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In view of the EEOC charge Kralik brought against the union after the 
district court ruled against her, which we discuss below, we doubt that 
it did so. 
 
5. Kralik also argues that the requested accommodation does not place 
an undue burden on the Commission because of "the existence of 
provisions [in the collective bargaining agreement] for other workers to 
voluntarily perform [overtime]." Br. at 7. This observation does not 
support her case because the forced overtime provision by its terms 
applies only "in the event that overtime opportunities are refused by all 
employees." 
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given special job placement ... in violation of a bona fide 
seniority system in place under a collectively bargained 
agreement, when such accommodation is the only way of 
meeting the job restrictions of that disabled individual." Id. 
at 1045-46. 
 
The Eckles court pointed out that the case posed "a 
conflict not so much between the rights of the disabled 
individual and his employer and union, but between the 
rights of the disabled individual and those of his co- 
workers." Id. at 1046. The court also observed that the 
applicability of 42 U.S.C. S 12112(b)(2), which Kralik 
invokes and which prohibits discrimination brought about 
through participation in contractual relationships, 
depended in that case on establishing a violation of section 
12112(b)(5)(A), since the only form of discrimination alleged 
there, as here, was the failure to provide a reasonable 
accommodation. Thus, if reasonable accommodation"does 
not require reassignment to a position held by another 
employee, the collective bargaining agreement at issue did 
not subject Eckles to prohibited discrimination by 
establishing a bona fide seniority system that regulates the 
holding of positions at Conrail." Eckles, 94 F.2d at 1046. 
 
The court acknowledged that a covered entity cannot 
avoid its ADA duties by contractual manipulation. But 
inasmuch as Eckles did not claim that "the seniority 
system was established, even in part, in order to bypass the 
duty to accommodate" a qualified individual with a 
disability under the ADA, there was "no evidence of . . . 
subterfuge." Id. The court then observed that: 
 
       if the ADA does not require that collectively bargained 
       seniority rights be compromised in order to reasonably 
       accommodate a disabled individual, Eckles cannot 
       establish that Conrail and the Union are guilty of 
       participating in a contractual arrangement that has the 
       effect of subjecting him to prohibited discrimination. 
       Hence the issue is simply what is required by 
       `reasonable accommodation.' 
 
Id. at 1046. 
 
The court recognized that although the accommodation 
Eckles sought did not require firing of other employees, 
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"what would be lost to the other employees, particularly 
more senior employees, would be some of the value of their 
seniority with the company, not their employment." Id. at 
1047. The court held that even this limited infringement on 
other employees' seniority rights was not reasonable under 
the ADA, and pointed out that: 
 
       courts have been unanimous in rejecting the claim that 
       `reasonable accommodation' under the Rehabilitation 
       Act requires reassignment of a disabled employee in 
       violation of a bona fide seniority system. In fact, a 
       virtual per se rule has emerged that such reassignment 
       is not required under the Rehabilitation Act's duty to 
       reasonably accommodate. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the Eckles court explained that 
Congress adopted the ADA against "the backdrop of well- 
established precedent that `reasonable accommodation' 
under the Rehabilitation Act had never been held to require 
trumping the seniority rights of other employees." Id. at 
1048. 
 
In concluding its comprehensive discussion, the Eckles 
court held that "[a]fter examining the text, background, and 
legislative history of the ADA duty of `reasonable 
accommodation,' we conclude that the ADA does not 
require disabled individuals to be accommodated by 
sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority 
rights of other employees." Id. at 1051. While the court 
recognized "that many of the `reasonable accommodations' 
specifically proposed within the ADA also have effects on 
other workers," it found that "collectively bargained 
seniority rights have a pre-existing special status in the law 
and that Congress to date has shown no intent to alter this 
status by the duties created under the ADA." Id. at 1052. 
 
Eckles is convincing and is in harmony with the other 
precedents we cite above. Thus, we, like the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, will follow it. See Foreman v. Babcock & 
Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Following 
the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold 
that the ADA does not require an employer to take action 
inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers 
under a collective bargaining agreement.").6 In doing so we 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Kralik relies heavily on Aka v. Washington Hosp. Center, 116 F.3d 
876, 890-97 (D.C. Cir. 1997), reh'g en banc granted and judgment 
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recognize that in Eckles the proposed infringement on other 
employees' seniority rights was far more intrusive than the 
infringement at issue here. Yet the lesser degree of 
infringement on other employees' seniority rights does not 
distinguish adequately this case from Eckles, which 
recognized the principle at stake here: an accommodation 
to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other 
employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is 
not reasonable. 
 
Requiring an employer to violate the collective bargaining 
agreement in situations where the employer regards the 
infringement on seniority rights as insubstantial and the 
accommodation reasonable unfairly would expose the 
employer to potential union grievances as neither the union 
nor the arbitrator hearing a grievance would be required to 
disregard violations of the collective bargaining agreement. 
Thus, a rule requiring an employer to violate seniority 
rights would subject the employer to the cost of defending 
itself against grievances as well as to the risk that it might 
be subject to a costly remedy. Accordingly, even minor 
infringements on other employees' seniority rights impose 
unreasonable burdens on employers who, by reason of 
those infringements, must face the consequences of 
violating the collective bargaining agreement. 
 
In this regard, we point out that, for reasons we do not 
know, the union apparently did not agree that the 
Commission could relieve Kralik from forced overtime for 
the duration of her status as a qualified individual with a 
disability. While Kralik seemed to contend at oral argument 
that the union would agree to such an arrangement if she 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997), which is inconsistent with 
Eckles and thus with the result we reach. Aka stated that "in some cases 
the degree of infringement imposed by a `reasonable accommodation' to 
one employee's disability on a `right' held by other employees under the 
collective bargaining agreement may be extremely slight, and may 
impose virtually no `hardship' at all," and thus stated that it would be 
"inappropriate to draw blanket conclusions regarding whether the ADA 
can `trump' provisions in collective bargaining agreements." Id. at 896. 
Aka, however, has been vacated and in any event is inconsistent with 
Eckles, which we find to be soundly reasoned. 
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established that she was a qualified individual with a 
disability who needed the accommodation, as we indicated 
above she points to nothing in the record to demonstrate 
that the union ever expressed to the Commission its 
willingness to extend the temporary agreement we have 
described.7 
 
What makes the requested accommodation in this case 
unreasonable is not that it would disrupt the Commission's 
operations because we cannot say that it would do so. 
Rather, the requested accommodation is unreasonable 
because it would require the employer to violate its 
collective bargaining agreement and run the risks that the 
violation entails. Accordingly, we reject Kralik's suggestion 
that an accommodation which requires an employer to 
violate a collective bargaining agreement may impose 
virtually no hardship on the employer. In short, it is 
appropriate for the union, rather than the employer, to 
make the determination that the infringement is justifiable 
by releasing the employer from its obligation to follow the 
seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement 
to accommodate a qualified individual with a disability.8 
 
At oral argument before us the Commission suggested 
that even if the union were willing to waive the forced 
overtime provision with respect to Kralik, because of the 
Commission's personnel needs it might not be able to 
accommodate Kralik by excusing her from forced overtime. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. According to Kralik the Commission has not applied the forced 
overtime provision to her during this litigation and yet the union has not 
instituted a grievance proceeding. While this may be true, it does not 
follow that the union will remain willing to refrain from grieving in the 
future. The union's apparent acquiescence merely is a de facto 
continuation of the temporary agreement we describe above. We decline 
to hold that the Commission is required to accommodate Kralik for the 
duration of her disability as we cannot assume that the union's 
acquiescence will continue indefinitely. 
 
8. We note, moreover, that if an employer grants an accommodation by 
violating seniority rights of other employees under the collective 
bargaining agreement, the employer in its operations may be making no 
accommodation at all. As the Eckles court recognized, the 
accommodation instead will be made by the disabled employee's co- 
workers who will lose a benefit of their seniority status. 
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Obviously we need not explore that claim, which the 
Commission apparently did not advance in the district 
court. We also point out that our decision does not 
necessarily preclude Kralik from being excused from the 
forced overtime provisions as the union in the future might 
assure the Commission that it will agree to the 
Commission's relieving Kralik from those provisions if she 
is a qualified individual with a disability who needs the 
accommodation. Such a waiver would eliminate the basis 
for our conclusion that the accommodation Kralik seeks is 
not reasonable, leaving for determination the question of 
whether Kralik is a qualified individual with a disability 
who would be entitled to be relieved from forced overtime as 
a reasonable accommodation. 
 
In light of our conclusions we will affirm the order for 
summary judgment entered December 16, 1996. Moreover, 
it is clear that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the motion for reconsideration, either on the 
grounds that the new material Kralik presented could not 
have affected the outcome of the case in the district court 
any more than it has here, see Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 
779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985), or on the separate 
grounds that Kralik offered no justification for her untimely 
presentation of the material. Consequently, we also will 
affirm the order entered January 14, 1997, denying the 
motion for reconsideration. 
 
B. The cross appeal 
 
The final issue that we address is the Commission's 
contention that the district court erred in denying its 
motion for summary judgment on the question of whether 
Kralik was a qualified individual with a disability. The 
Commission recognizes its apparent lack of standing to 
appeal and acknowledges "that in the normal course a 
party must be aggrieved by the final judgment of the 
district court which it seeks to challenge." Br. at 16. In fact, 
it even cites cases supporting the principle, namely Deposit 
Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333-34, 100 S.Ct. 
1166, 1171-72 (1980), and Watson v. City of Newark, 746 
F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir. 1984). Yet it contends that courts 
"have permitted an appeal from a seemingly favorable 
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disposition when adverse practical consequences, not 
normally contemplated by legal theory or policy 
considerations, manifest themselves." Br. at 16. On this 
point the Commission contends that the denial of summary 
judgment has prejudiced it in an EEOC proceeding, which 
Kralik brought against the Commission and the union after 
the district court denied her motion for reconsideration, 
alleging retaliation for her having brought this action, and 
discrimination based on her disability and her sex. 
 
We are satisfied that even if in some cases a completely 
successful party might have standing to appeal, this is not 
such a case. In its partial denial of the Commission's 
motion for summary judgment, the district court merely 
held that at a particular time based on the record before it 
there was a dispute of fact as to whether Kralik was a 
qualified individual with a disability. While we certainly 
understand why the Commission would like a ruling that 
Kralik was not a qualified individual with a disability at 
that time, the district court's inherently tentative 
conclusion, though unhelpful to the Commission, is not 
harmful to it either, because the conclusion does not 
preclude the Commission from rejecting a new 
accommodation sought by Kralik or from prevailing in any 
challenge to that rejection on the grounds that she is not a 
qualified individual with a disability.9  The Commission has 
failed to identify sufficient adverse consequences of the 
order from which it cross appeals to confer standing to 
appeal. See In re DES Litig., 7 F.3d 20, 23-25 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(dismissing appeal for lack of standing where appellant 
prevailed below and was not aggrieved by collateral estoppel 




In view of the aforesaid, we will affirm the orders of 
December 16, 1996, and January 14, 1997, and will 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We do not suggest that we could not have reviewed the part of the 
order denying summary judgment had we disagreed with the district 
court's entry of summary judgment on the issues addressed in this 
opinion. 
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dismiss the cross appeal. The parties will bear their own 
costs on this appeal. 
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MANSMANN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
Because I would not hold that a requested 
accommodation for purposes of the ADA is per se 
unreasonable where it conflicts with the seniority 
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, I 
respectfully dissent. Although the majority holdingfinds 
support in the caselaw, resolution of the issue before us is 
not as straightforward as the majority opinion suggests. 
 
Tension between the ADA and other labor relations 
statutes, particularly the National Labor Relations Act 
("NLRA"), is inevitable. As one commentator observed: 
 
       While the ADA fosters equal employment opportunities 
       for all Americans without regard to disability, its 
       drafters ignored a very serious problem. The ADA, 
       while promoting the rights of individual Americans in 
       the workplace, conflicts dramatically with the[NLRA], 
       an act designed to promote collective rights in the 
       workplace. The ADA, the regulations, and the 
       Interpretive Guidance all fail to address the issue of 
       how to reasonably accommodate an individual with a 
       disability under the ADA in a unionized setting-- 
       where such rights are typically received as part of a 
       collective bargaining agreement. As a result of this 
       oversight, conflicts between the NLRA and the ADA 
       have arisen. 
 
Robert W. Pritchard, Avoiding the Inevitable: Resolving the 
Conflicts Between the ADA and the NLRA, 11 The Labor 
Lawyer 375 (1995). This statutory tension has been 
particularly apparent where, as here, the duty to provide a 
reasonable accommodation under the ADA conflicts with an 
arguably contrary collective bargaining obligation. 
 
The text of the ADA does not "decisively answer the 
question of whether `reasonable accommodation' can 
require that otherwise valid seniority rights of other 
employees be trumped." Eckles v. Consolidated Rail 
Corporation, 94 F.3d 1041, 1047 (7th Cir. 1996). In this 
way, the ADA differs from other anti-discrimination 
statutes. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (Title VII) specifically authorizes employers"[t]o apply 
different standards of compensation, or different terms, 
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conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona 
fide seniority or merit system. . . ." 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(h). 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) contains 
an analogous provision: "It shall not be unlawful for an 
employer, employment agency or labor organization . . . to 
observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system.. . ." 29 
U.S.C. S 623(f)(2)(A). Courts required to assess the 
competing concerns of reasonable accommodation and the 
sanctity of the collective bargaining agreement have 
regularly relied on precedent generated under the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the Rehabilitation Act). 29 
U.S.C. S 701 et seq. "[T]he term `reasonable accommodation' 
in the ADA was apparently borrowed from the regulations 
issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
[EEOC] in implementation of the Rehabilitation Act. . . ." 
Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1047. In determining whether an 
accommodation which conflicts with a collective bargaining 
agreement can ever be reasonable, courts construing the 
Rehabilitation Act have adopted a per se rule: a collective 
bargaining agreement will always "trump" the  
accommodation.1 
 
Confronted with Congress' failure to articulate definitively 
a different rule in cases arising under the ADA, a number 
of our sister courts of appeals have applied or have 
indicated that they would apply this Rehabilitation Act per 
se rule in reasonable accommodation cases arising under 
the ADA.2 The majority, relying primarily upon the decision 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See, e.g., Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1989); Carter v. 
Tisch, 
822 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1987); Daubert v. United States Postal Service, 
733 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984). 
 
2. Maj. opinion at 6. It is important to note that the courts in Milton v. 
Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 1995), and Wooten v. Farmland 
Foods, 58 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1995), discussed the per se rule in the 
context of the ADA in dicta. Neither analyzed the conflict between the 
ADA and the NLRA. 
 
It is important to note, too, that a number of commentators have 
criticized application of a per se rule in the context of the ADA. See 
Jerry 
M. Hunter, Potential Conflicts Between Obligations Imposed on Employees 
and Unions by the National Labor Relations Act and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 13 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 207 (1993); Robert W. Pritchard, 
 
                                19 
 
 
in Eckles, embraces this approach. I am convinced, 
however, that this per se rule, imported from cases decided 
under the Rehabilitation Act, was not intended to apply in 
the context of the ADA. 
 
Although the plain text of the ADA does not definitively 
resolve the issue before us, it does contain language which 
suggests that seniority systems, inviolable under the 
Rehabilitation Act, might, in certain circumstances, yield to 
reasonable accommodation claims. Unlike the 
Rehabilitation Act and Title VII, the ADA defines the term 
"reasonable accommodation" to include: "job restructuring, 
part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a 
vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment 
. . . and other similar accommodations for individuals with 
disabilities." 42 U.S.C. S 12111(9)(B). In a unionized 
workplace, these potential accommodations will almost 
always conflict to some degree with established seniority 
systems. The ADA, however, indicates that these 
accommodations should be made available without 
addressing their impact on seniority concerns. While this 
feature of the ADA is not dispositive, it is significant, 
especially when it is considered against the background of 
the ADA's broad sweep3 and its legislative history. 
 
The Report of the House Committee on Education and 
Labor supports the conclusion that under the ADA, the 
collective bargaining agreements, including those provisions 
impacting seniority, were not intended to "trump" 
reasonable accommodation claims: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Avoiding the Inevitable: Resolving the Conflicts Between the ADA and the 
NLRA, 11 The Labor Lawyer 375 (1995); Joanne Jocha Ervin, Reasonable 
Accommodation and the Collective Bargaining Agreement Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 1991 Det. C. L. Rev. 925 (1991); Rose- 
Daly Rooney, Note, Reconciling Conflicts Between the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and the National Labor Relations Act to Accommodate 
People With Disabilities, 6 DePaul Bus. L. J. 387 (1994). 
 
3. The ADA expanded the scope of the Rehabilitation Act both in 
coverage and in the degree of protection afforded. See, Note, Civil Rights 
and the Disabled: A Comparison of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 in the Employment Setting, 54 
Alb. L. Rev. 123 124-25 (1989). 
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       The collective bargaining agreement could be relevant 
       . . . in determining whether a given accommodation is 
       reasonable. For example, if a collective bargaining 
       agreement reserves certain jobs for employees with a 
       given amount of seniority, it may be considered as a 
       factor in determining whether it is a reasonable 
       accommodation to assign an employee with a disability 
       without seniority to that job. However, the agreement 
       would not be determinative on this issue.4 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 485 (II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 345 (emphasis added). 
These reports provide sound foundation for the argument 
that Congress intended to depart from the line of authority 
developed under the Rehabilitation Act holding that a 
requested accommodation is per se unreasonable when it 
conflicts with a seniority provision in a collective bargaining 
agreement. The legislative history indicates that courts are 
obligated to look beyond the collective bargaining 
agreement in order to determine whether a particular 
accommodation is reasonable. The status of the collective 
bargaining agreement under the ADA has been diminished; 
it is now only one factor to be considered in determining 
whether a proposed accommodation is reasonable. 
 
Additional evidence for this view of the role of collective 
bargaining agreements under the ADA is found in the 
legislative history relating to the "undue hardship" 
provisions of the Act. Under the ADA, an employer's failure 
to make "reasonable accommodations to the known 
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability" constitutes prohibited 
discrimination "unless [the employer] can demonstrate that 
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship 
on the operation of the business. . . ." 42 U.S.C. 
S 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 
The EEOC regulations interpreting this section provide 
that an employer may demonstrate "that the provision of a 
particular accommodation would be unduly disruptive to its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources 
contains language identical to that of the House Report. See S.Rep. No. 
101-116 at 32 (1989). 
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other employees or to the functioning of its business. The 
terms of a collective bargaining agreement may be relevant 
to this determination." 29 C.F.R. S 1630.15(d) app. (1996) 
(emphasis added). The EEOC's Technical Assistance 
Manual underscores the reduced role assigned to the 
collective bargaining agreement under the ADA, stating that 
"[t]he terms of a collective bargaining agreement may be 
relevant in determining whether an accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship." EEOC Technical Assistance 
Manual S 3.09, at III-16 (1992). The example given in the 
Manual to illustrate the status of a collective bargaining 
agreement in determining undue hardship refers 
specifically to a situation where the requested 
accommodation conflicts with a seniority provision in a 
collective bargaining agreement: 
 
       A worker who has a deteriorated disc condition and 
       cannot perform the heavy labor functions of a 
       machinist job, requests reassignment to a vacant 
       clerk's job as a reasonable accommodation. If the 
       collective bargaining agreement has specific seniority 
       lists and requirements governing each craft, it might be 
       an undue hardship to reassign this person if others 




Clearly, the EEOC did not assume that Congress, in 
drafting the ADA, had incorporated the per se rule adopted 
by the majority. If seniority provisions of a collective 
bargaining agreement were inviolate under the Act, any 
conflicting proposed accommodation would automatically 
be unreasonable; there would never be a need to consider 
whether such an accommodation posed an undue 
hardship. 
 
The text of the ADA, its legislative history, and the 
relevant EEOC regulations convince me that there are 
enough dissimilarities between the Rehabilitation Act and 
the ADA to warrant rejection of the per se rule announced 
by the majority in favor of a fact-intensive approach which 
examines whether a particular proposed accommodation 
constitutes an "undue hardship." This approach, which is 
consistent with the statute, the legislative history, and the 
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regulations, protects all parties, including those other 
employees subject to the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement by allowing each accommodation to be examined 
in light of its cumulative impact on the business operation 
as a whole. Far from being ignored under this approach, 
the collective bargaining agreement is relegated to its 
intended status as a factor to be considered in determining 
whether a requested accommodation imposes an undue 
hardship. 
 
Although I recognize that the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Aka v. Washington Hospital, 
116 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1997), reh'g in banc granted and 
judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997), lacks 
precedential value, I find its analysis and rejection of Eckles 
sound and adopt its reasoning as the essence of my 
disagreement with the majority: 
 
       [I] reject the Eckles court's analysis because the plain 
       language of the ADA requires employers to provide 
       accommodations to the disabilities of qualified 
       employees unless the accommodation in question 
       would be "unreasonable" or would impose an"undue 
       hardship," because the suggested "reasonable 
       accommodations" listed in the statute include several 
       . . . that commonly will conflict to some degree with the 
       applicable collective bargaining agreements in 
       unionized workplaces -- including the portions of those 
       agreements creating "seniority rights," and because 
       both the legislative history of the ADA and the relevant 
       EEOC regulations clearly indicate that the fact that a 
       particular accommodation would require some 
       departure from the terms of a collective bargaining 
       agreement should not in itself determine the question 
       of whether an employer may be required to provide the 
       accommodation. . . . 
 
* * * * 
 
       [I] likewise think it is inappropriate to draw blanket 
       conclusions regarding whether the ADA can "trump" 
       provisions in collective bargaining agreements, or 
       whether the ADA can require the "sacrifice[ ]" of "rights" 
       created in other employees by these agreements. . . . 
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       [A]fter all, in some cases the degree of infringement 
       imposed . . . may impose virtually no "hardship" at all. 
       If one nondisabled employee entitled to a vacant 
       position under the seniority system in the collective 
       bargaining agreement must wait an extra day before 
       receiving an identical assignment because the earlier 
       vacancy was filled by a disabled employee pursuant to 
       the ADA, would this entail the "sacrifice" of rights 
       created in other employees under the agreement? . . . 
       [I] think that the ADA's "reasonable accommodation" 
       provisions require us to bear in mind that conflicts 
       between accommodations to disabled employees and 
       the terms of applicable collective bargaining 
       agreements exist on a continuum rather than 
       functioning like an "on/off switch."5 
 
At 895-96 (citations omitted). 
 
The approach adopted by the majority in reliance on 
Eckles could well lead to absurd results which run counter 
to the broad remedial purposes of the ADA.6 The better 
approach would be to jettison the per se rule developed in 
the context of the far less sweeping Rehabilitation Act in 
favor of the balancing process already in place under the 
ADA in the determination of "undue hardship." The result 
reached in Eckles under the undue hardship balancing 
analysis would likely be unchanged where in this case, the 
outcome would be far less certain. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the order of 
the district court granting summary judgment in favor of 
the Commission based on the court's conclusion that the 
requested accommodation was per se unreasonable. In all 
other respects, I would affirm the order of the district court. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. A similar result was reached in a case decided prior to Eckles, Emrick 
v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 396 (E.D. Tex. 1995). 
 
6. The academic response to the decision in Eckles has been less than 
enthusiastic. See William Mcdevitt, Seniority Systems and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act: The Fate of Reasonable Accommodation after Eckles, 
9 St. Thomas L. Rev. 359 (1997); Condon A. McGlothlen and Gary N. 
Savine, Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp.: Reconciling the ADA with 
Collective Bargaining Agreements: Is This the Correct Approach?; 46 
DePaul L. Rev. 1043 (1997). 
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